The Psychology of Board Oversight: How Board Independence and Technical Expertise Shape the Quality of Cybersecurity Information
Abstract
This quantitative research draws attention to cybersecurity concerns through a lens of board independence and technical expertise, grounded in agency theory and resource-based theory, respectively. We built on a vast panel data set (2014–2023) covering 1300 firms across 50 countries and 10,056 firm-year observations, which were subjected to rigorous estimation techniques. We employed fixed and random effects, alternative independent variables, lagged specifications, endogeneity tests and additional tests to ensure the consistency of the results. Concerning mainstream relation, we found that (1) board independence (β = 0.012, p < 0.01) improves the quality of cybersecurity disclosure. Additionally, (2) the presence of board technical expertise (β = 0.04, p < 0.01) strengthens the mainstream impact. Our findings are consequential for strengthening the theoretical base and policy-making, wherein the integration of the aforementioned theories into a single framework advances the cyber resilience and corporate governance literature while offering several practical implications. Regulators, corporate leadership, and investors could streamline their decisions guided by this research. Overall, we establish that board independence and technical expertise signal the effectiveness of cybersecurity information.
Keywords
Citation Information
@article{mujahidbilalkhan2026,
title={The Psychology of Board Oversight: How Board Independence and Technical Expertise Shape the Quality of Cybersecurity Information},
author={Mujahid Bilal Khan and SongSheng Chen and Usman Sarwar and Hassan Zafar and Sonia Sattar},
journal={Research Square},
year={2026},
doi={https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9423236/v1}
}
SinoXiv