This study examines how elite families maintained status through marriage under a meritocratic system, using genealogical data from 1,539 imperial examination successful candidates across 18 provinces in Qing China (1614–1854). Conventional measures substantially underestimate assortative mating. While the raw correlation between fathers’ and fathers-in-law’s social standings is approximately 0.4, correcting for measurement error reveals a correlation of 0.8, comparable to documented elite persistence rates. Despite this high assortative mating, systematic hypergamy existed: 80% of marriages within the lowest strata were homoga-mous compared to only 24% within the highest strata, reflecting marriage market dynamics where son preference, discouraged widow remarriage, and widespread concubinage created scarcity of marriageable women. Elite families strategically adjusted marriage patterns based on mobility trajectories, placing less emphasis on brides’ backgrounds when rising but prioritizing influential families when facing decline. Extended matrilineal relatives beyond fathers-in-law significantly influenced descendants’ outcomes, demonstrating that parentally arranged marriages created broad kinship alliances. These findings reveal marriage as a crucial mechanism for elite perpetuation even under formal equality of opportunity, showing how families strategically deployed marriage to mitigate downward mobility risks across generations. JEL Classification: J12, N35, O15